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The Anabolic Steroids Control Act of
1990: A Need for Change
Mr. President, today the Senate will take action on a bill to
address one of America's most serious drug problems: the abuse
of anabolic steroids. Though we do not hear much about it, the
fact is that steroid abuse is nearly as widespread as the use of
crack cocaine is among male high school students.'
Steroids will remain a part of an athlete's training, whether
we want it or not, but they should be administered by competent
doctors, openly and non sub rosa by coaches.
2
I. Introduction
On February 5, 1991, Dr. George T. Zahorian III, an osteopath
and urological surgeon from suburban Harrisburg, was indicted by
the United States Attorney for knowingly distributing anabolic ster-
oids "for use in humans other than the treatment of disease pursuant
to the order of a physician," in violation of the Anabolic Steroids
Control Act of 1990. 8 Dr. Zahorian's trial gained national attention
1. 136 CONG. REC. S16615-03 (1990) (statement of Senator Biden).
2. Janke J. Robertson, et al., Medical and Nonmedical Uses of Anabolic-Androgenic
Steroids, 264 JAMA 2925 (1990).
3. Defendant's Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss Indictment at 1, United States v.
Zahorian, Criminal No. I:CR-91-023 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 1991). Specifically Dr. Zahorian
was charged with five separate counts of violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), as well as ten sepa-
rate counts of knowingly distributing anabolic steroids in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 333(e)(1)
which provided:
(e) Anabolic steroids
(1) [Any person who distributes or possesses with the intent to distribute
any anabolic steroid for any use in humans other than the treatment of disease
pursuant to the order of a physician shall be imprisoned for not more than three
years or fined under Title 18, or both ....
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 333(e)(1) (1988). United States of
America v. Zahorian, Criminal No. 1:CR-91-23 (M.D. Pa. June 14, 1991) (mem.) (quoting
The Crime Control Act of 1990 implicitly repealed Section 333(e)(1) when the Act was
passed on November 29, 1990, and replaced it with an almost identical provision, except that
it regulates the distribution of human growth hormone. 21 U.S.C. § 333(e) now provides as
follows:
(e)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), any person who distributes or pos-
sesses with the intent to distribute any anabolic steroid for any use in humans
other than the treatment of disease, pursuant to the order of a physician shall be
impisoned for not more than 3 years or fined under title 18, United States Code,
or both.
(2) Any person who distributes or possesses with the intent to distribute to
an indiivdual under 18 years of age, any anabolic steroid for any use in humans
other than the treatment of disease pursuant to the order of a physician shall be
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when it was revealed that he allegedly supplied anabolic-androgenic
steroids to World Wrestling Federation stars such as "Superstar"
Billy Graham.' With the simultaneous revelation by former NFL
lineman Lyle Alzado that he believed steroid use helped cause his
cancer, the "steroid issue" was placed into national prominence.5
To date, Dr. Zahorian remains the only physician indicted and
convicted of violating the Anabolic Steroids Control Act of 1990 for
"prescribing" anabolic steroids for a purpose other than the treat-
ment of disease.' Unfortunately, at this time there has yet to be any
published judicial opinion on the effect of the Anabolic Steroids
Control Act or how it will be applied to physicians as a group. How-
ever, the conviction of Dr. Zahorian has revealed the inherent defect
of the Act: its overbreadth and resultant non-conformity with the
Legislature's stated purpose.
The Anabolic Steroids Control Act of 1990 makes it a criminal
offense for a physician to knowingly distribute human growth hor-
mone (steroids) "for any use in humans other than the treatment of
a disease (emphasis added) or other recognized medical condition."
'7
The author feels that the statutory mandate allowing a physician to
distribute steroids to a patient only for the treatment of a disease or
for a medical condition recognized by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services is unconstitutional. This statutory language is so
overdrawn that it is not rationally related to the stated, legitimate
government purpose.
This Comment begins with a brief history of anabolic-andro-
genic steroids and their beneficial and adverse effects. The Comment
then investigates the history of the Anabolic Steroids Control Act of
1990 and its stated purpose of alleviating the perceived threat posed
imprisoned for not more than six years or fined under title 18, United States
Code, or both.
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.A. §333(e)(1) (1991). The Crime Control
Act also enacted sections 802(41), 812(c), Schedule III (e), and section 290aa-6(b)(12) of
Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare Act, amended section 844 of this title, repealed
section 333a of this title and enacted provisions set out as notes under sections 802 and 829 of
this title. The statutory language states that these enactments may be cited as the Anabolic
Steroids Control Act of 1990. 21 U.S.C. § 333(e)(1) (1988).
4. Dave Meltzer, The Sham is a Sham, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 8, 1991, at 9, 10.
5. Id. at 10. Alzado admitted that there is no written, documented proof that steroids
and/or human growth hormone caused his cancer. Lyle Alzado, as told to Shelly Smith, I'm
Sick and I'm Scared, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 8, 1991, at 21. Alzado died on May 14, 1992
at the age of 43. Maryann Hudson, Lyle Alzado is Dead at 43 of Cancer, L.A. TIMES, May 15,
1992, at C-I.
6. United States v. Zahorian, Criminal No. 1:CR-91-23 (M.D. Pa. June 14, 1991)
(mem.). Dr. Zahorian was convicted and the case was affirmed on appeal, United States v.
Zahorian, No. 92-7003, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 18933 (3d Cir. July 17, 1992).
7. 21 U.S.C. § 3333(e)(1) (1988) (emphasis added).
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by steroids. The Comment then explores the overall constitutionality
of the Act and its constitutionality as imposed against physicians.
Finally, this Comment discusses the various public policy reasons for
invalidation of the Anabolic Steroids Control Act of 1990.
A. History of Anabolic-Androgenic Steroids
The first reported use of anabolic-androgenic steroids occurred
during World War II when German combat troops were given ana-
bolic steroids to increase their aggressiveness. 8 Anecdotal reports in-
dicate that the Russians initiated their use in athletics in 1954.9
Since that time, the use of anabolic steroids has increased dramati-
cally with an "abuse explosion" occurring in the 1980's.10
Anabolic-androgenic steroids are prescription drugs that have
many legitimate medical uses."1 Prior to the enactment of the Ana-
8. Christopher Carl Oliva, Anabolic Steroid-Induced Psychiatric Reactions, 24 DICP
THE ANNALS OF PHARMACOTHERAPY 388 (1990).
9. JOHN R. MAY, STATE LAwS/REGULATIONS PERTAINING TO THE CONTROL OF ANA-
BOLIC STEROIDS 1 (1989). A copy of this compilation may be found in the offices of the Dick-
inson Law Review.
10. Id.
11. Robertson, supra note 2, at 2923; see also May, supra note 9. Anabolic steroids are
defined as synthetic derivatives of the male hormone testosterone, having pronounced anabolic
properties and relatively weak androgenic properties (i.e., producing masculine characteris-
tics), which are used clinically to promote growth and to repair body tissue in people who are
in states of senility, debilitating illness, and convalescence. The FDA has approved a relatively
small number of anabolic steroids as prescription drugs, which may be prescribed only by
licensed practitioners for legitimate medical purposes. Under the Anabolic Steroids Control
Act, steroids are defined as follows:
(41) term 'anabolic steroids' means any drug or hormonal substance, chemically
and pharmacologically related to the testosterone (other than estrogens, proges-
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bolic Steroids Control Act of 1990, androgens and anabolic steroids
were commonly used to accelerate irregular childhood growth, in-
crease libido and maintain secondary sexual characteristics in aging
men, improve calcium balance; treat endometriosis, treat anemia,
promote postoperative recovery or aid in terminal diseases, treat
breast cancer, promote muscle growth in elderly individuals, and cor-
rect deficient endocrine function of the testes.1 2 Prior to the enact-
ment of the Anabolic Steroids Control Act, the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA) approved steroids for both disease and non-
disease conditions.
13
The most frequent use of steroids, however, is as an aid in body
building and/or to provide skeletal muscle enlargement or increased
strength by persons in good health. 4 It has been estimated that "as
many as 500,000 male high school seniors use, or have used, steroids;
one-third of these users are 15 or younger; and 40 percent of these
users are hard-core or weekly users."1 5 Various steroids have been







(xxviii) any salt, ester, or isomer of a drug or substance described or
listed in this paragraph, if that salt, ester, or isomer promotes muscle
growth.
Title 21 U.S.C. § 802(41)(A) (Supp. II 1990).
12. See also Robert C. Hickson, et al., Adverse Effects of Anabolic Steroids, MED.
ToxiCOL. ADVERSE DRUG EXPERIMENT 4(4):254, 258-60 (1989). Although steroids have been
used to treat numerous growth problems, disorders, and diseases, the results have been contra-
dictory and difficult to replicate. However, several researchers have found steroids to be helpful
in the treatment of patients. Id.
13. See generally, Ferid Murad and Robert C. Haynes, Androgens in GOODMAN &
GILMAN, PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS, 1140, 1451-54 (1985).
14. 136 CONG. REC. S16615-03 (1990). See also W.E. Buckley, et. al., Estimated Prev-
alence of Anabolic Steroid Use Among Male High School Seniors, 260 JAMA 3441 (1988).
A national study, conducted in 1987, indicated that as many as 6.6 percent of the 12th grade
males in the United States use or have used anabolic steroids. According to this and other
studies, athletes are the most common users of anabolic steroids among high school and college
students. One high school study found that 84 percent of anabolic steroid users participated in
sports. Mimi D. Johnson, et. al., Anabolic Steroid Use by Male Adolescents, 83 PEDIATRICS
922 (1989). According to a 15-year study of college students at five universities, between 15
and 20 percent of the college athletes reported using anabolic steroids. J. Dezelsky, et. al.,
United Nations Non-Medical Drug Use Behavior at Five United States Universities: A 15-
Year Study, 37 BULLETIN ON NARCOTICS 49, 51 (1985).
Less information is available on the prevalence of anabolic steroid use outside of high
school and college. The two above-mentioned studies addressed use in relatively small samples
of weightlifters. The results show that a high percentage of weightlifters studied use steroids.
However, the results cannot be projected beyond the weightlifters included in the studies. Id.
15. 136 CONG. REC. S16615-03 (1990); see also Mimi D. Johnson, Anabolic Steroid
Use in Adolescent Athletes, 37 PEDIATRICS III 1 (1990).
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athletic prowess.16 The use of steroids has become so prevalent in
sports that the International Olympic Committee, the NCAA, and
several professional sporting organizations have enacted stringent
steroid testing procedures."7 Nevertheless, many athletes have admit-
ted publicly that the use of performance-enhancing drugs, such as
steroids, remains widespread."8
Although anabolic steroids have been used by athletes for the
past few decades, evidence is conflicting and inconclusive as to
whether they significantly increase athletic performance by increas-
ing muscle strength or muscle size.' 9 There is also a lack of definitive
research on the adverse effects of prolonged steroid use.20 However,
the research available states that there may be severe adverse effects
such as liver abnormalities, reproductive disorders, virilisation,
feminisation, development of diabetes, cardiovascular effects, cere-
bral dangers, musculoskeletal injuries, and prostatic cancer.2' It
should be noted, however, that the physicians who conducted this
research caution that their findings are not conclusive without fur-
ther research.22
B. State and Federal Legislation Regulating the Prescription of
Anabolic-Androgenic Steroids
In recognition of the possible adverse effects of steroids and
their abuse for non-therapeutic purposes, there has been considerable
legislative and administrative activity in this area. For example, in
1988 Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, which in-
cluded several provisions to control the use of anabolic steroids and
human growth hormone.23 FDA data show that as of June 16, 1989,
16. J. Otis Cochran, Drug Testing of Athletes and the United States Constitution: Cri-
sis and Conflict, 92 DICK. L. REV. 571, 571-74 (1988).
17. Id. at 575.
18. Paul J. Perry, et. al., Illicit Anabolic Steroid Use in Athletes, AMER. J. OF SPoTrs
MED. 422 (1990).
19. Anabolic Steroids (Systemic), USP DI 71 (1990) (physician pamphlet detailing
pharmacology and adverse effects of systemic anabolic steroids). A copy of this pamphlet is
available in the offices of the Dickinson Law Review.
20. Hickson, supra note 12, at 261.
21. Hickson, supra note 12, at 261-66.
22. Robertson, supra note 2, at 2925.
23. See e.g., The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690 (current version
codified as The Anabolic Steroids Control Act of 1990, 21 U.S.C. § 801 (Supp. 11 1990)). The
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 provided for the forfeiture of specified property of an individual
convicted of a violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act involving anabolic ster-
oids or human growth hormone, if the violation is punishable by imprisonment for more than 1
year. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 also specified that violators are subject to imprison-
ment for up to 3 years or a fine or both if they distribute or possess anabolic steroids with the
intent to distribute for any use in humans other than the treatment of disease based on the
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31 states have enacted laws or promulgated regulations to control
the use of anabolic steroids.24 Five of these states have enacted laws
or promulgated regulations controling the use of human growth
hormone.2 5
Information provided by FDA also shows that some states have
classified anabolic steroids as controlled substances, and at least one
state has promulgated rules regarding the medical profession's re-
sponsibility in prescribing, dispensing, or delivering these drugs. "6
Anabolic steroids are regulated as controlled substances under state
law in nine states; in addition, six states have legislation pending that
would classify anabolic steroids as controlled substances.17 One state
has classified human growth hormone as a controlled substance. 8
C. History of the Anabolic Steroids Control Act of 1990
In response to the public's growing concern over the use of ana-
bolic-androgenic steroids for nonmedical purposes, Congress enacted
The Anabolic Steroids Control Act of 1990.29 The Act placed ana-
bolic steroids on Schedule III of the Controlled Substances Act thus
making illegal possession of these drugs punishable by up to one year
in prison and possession with the intent to distribute punishable by
up to five years imprisonment.30 The Act also amended the Food,
order of a physician.
24. MAY, supra note 9, at 2.
25. 137 CONG. REC. E450-02 (1991). See also, H.R. REP. No. 681(1), 101st Cong., 1
Sess. 6472, 6473 (1990) (Anabolic Steroid Control Act passed as Title III of the Crime Con-
trol Act of 1990 to address criminal actions which endanger the physical safety or health of
our fellow citizens).
26. 137 CONG. REC. E450-02 (1991).
27. Id. at 94.
28. Id.
29. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act found at 21 U.S.C. § 333(e)(1) (1988).
30. Anabolic Steroids were placed under schedule Ill of the Controlled Substances Act
under 21 U.S.C. § 812, which provides in relevant part as follows:
§ 812. Schedules of controlled substances
(a) Establishment
There are established five schedules of controlled substances, to be known as
schedules I, II, I11, IV, and V. Such schedules shall initially consist of the sub-
stances listed in this section. The schedules established by this section shall be
updated and republished on a semiannual basis during the two-year period be-
ginning one year after the date of enactment of this title [enacted October 27,
1970] and shall be updated and republished on an annual basis thereafter.
(b) Placement on schedules; findings required
Except where control is required by United States obligations under an in-
ternational treaty, convention, or protocol, in effect on the effective date of this
part, and except in the case of an immediate precursor, a drug or other sub-
stance may not be placed in any schedule unless the findings required for such
schedule are made with respect to such drug or other substance. The findings
required for each of the schedules are as follows:
(1) Schedule I
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Drug and Cosmetic Act by making distribution of, and possession
with the intent to distribute, human growth hormone without a doc-
tor's order punishable by up to three years imprisonment. If the re-
cipient is under 18, the maximum punishment for the prescriber is
six years in prison.31
(A) The drug or other substance has a high potential for abuse.
(B) The drug or other substance has no currently accepted medical use in
treatment in the United States.
(C) There is a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug or other sub-
stance under medical supervision.
(2) Schedule II
(A) The drug or other substance has a high potential for abuse.
(B) The drug or other substance has a currently accepted medical use in
treatment in the United States or a currently accepted medical use with
severe restrictions.
(C) Abuse of the drug or other substances may lead to severe psychologi-
cal or physical dependence.
(3) Schedule III
(A) The drug or other substance has a potential for abuse less than the
drugs or other substances in schedules I and II.
(B) The drug or other substance has a currently accepted medical use in
treatment in the United States.
(C) Abuse of the drug or other substance may lead to moderate or low
physical dependence or high psychological dependence.
(4) Schedule IV
(A) The drug or other substance has a low potential for abuse relative to
the drugs or other substances in schedule III.
(B) The drug or other substance has a currently accepted medical use in
treatment in the United States.
(C) Abuse of the drug or other substance may lead to limited physical
dependence relative to the drugs or other substances in schedule III.
(5) Schedule V
(A) The drug or other substance has a low potential for abuse relative to
the drugs or other substances in schedule IV.
(B) The drug or other substance has a currently accepted medical use in
treatment in the United States.
(C) Abuse of the drug or other substance may lead to limited physical
dependence or psychological dependence relative to the drugs or other
substances in Schedule IV.
21 U.S.C. § 812 (1988).
31. 21 U.S.C. § 333 (1988). Chapter 9 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as
amended to include Human Growth Hormone, now reads in relevant part as follows:
§ 333. Penalties
(a) Violation of 21 U.S.C. 331
(1) Any person who violates a provision of section 301 [21 U.S.C. 331] of
this title shall be imprisoned for not more than one year or fined not more than
$1,000, or both.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (i) of this section, if any
person commits such a violation after a conviction of him under this section has
become final, or commits such a violation with the intent to defraud or mislead,
such person shall be imprisoned for not more than three years or fined not more
than $10,000, or both.
(e) Distribution of or possession with intent to distribute anabolic steroids;
exception.
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), any person who distributes or pos-
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The stated Legislative purpose for creating the Act was to re-spond to the various aspects of the problem of crime in the United
States.32 In particular the Legislature believed that because of the
suspected health risks associated with the misuse of anabolic steroids
as well as indications from the Department of Justice that steroid
misuse was a growing problem, legislation had to be enacted to exer-
cise greater control over distribution and use of steroids. 33 The Leg-
islature first became aware of the need for legislation through re-
ports that enumerated the pervasive nature of steroid use in the
United States and in particular its use by young people. 34 Thus, the
Legislature believed that because of the reported significant adverse
health consequences, both physical and psychological, 35 it was re-
quired to take action to control the non-therapeutic use of steroids.
II. Constitutional Infirmity of the Anabolic Steroids Control Act of
1990
The Anabolic Steroids Control Act of 1990 makes it a criminal
offense for a physician to knowingly distribute human growth hor-
mone (steroids) "for any use in humans other than the treatment of
a disease or other recognized medical condition." 3 The requirement
that a physician can distribute steroids to a patient only for the
treatment of a disease or for a medical condition recognized by the
Secretary of Health and Human Services is unconstitutional since it
is so overdrawn that it is not rationally related to the stated, legiti-
mate government purpose.
The stated Legislative purpose for enacting the Anabolic Ster-
sesses with intent to distribute any anabolic steroid for any use in humans other
than the treatment of disease pursuant to the order of a physician shall be im-
prisoned for not more than three years or fined under title 18, United States
Code, or both.
(2) Any person who distributes or possesses with the intent to distribute to
an individual under 18 years of age, any anabolic steroid for any use in humans
other than the treatment of disease pursuant to the order of a physician shall be
imprisoned for not more than six years or fined under title 18, United States
Code, or both.
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, found at 21 U.S.C. § 333 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
32. H. REo. No. 681(1), 101st Cong. 1 Sess., 6472, 6473 (1990).
33. 137 CONG. REC. E450-02 (1991).
34. Id.
35. Id. See also Perry, et. al., supra note 18, at 422-428 ([Tjhe real experts on anabolic
steroid use and their adverse effects are not medical clinicians but the athletes who actually
have used steroids for prolonged periods.). H. REP. No. 681(1), 101st Cong., I Sess., 6473 at
94 (1990). Adverse effects include cardiovascular problems, liver toxicities, changes in sex
characteristics and reproductive capacities, increases in blood pressure and chloresterol levels,
and psychological changes. Perry, supra.
36. 21 U.S.C. § 333(e)(1), supra note 3 (emphasis added).
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oids Control Act was to protect the public from the dangerous threat
of physical and mental harm that steroids have been alleged to
cause."a Congress believed that since steroids were prescribed legally
for "a small number of medical conditions such as certain anemias,
hereditary angioedema, and breast cancer," it was in the best inter-
est of the public to make criminal any prescription of steroids except
for these limited "disease" uses. 8 Thus, the only time a physician
may prescribe steroids is for treatment of a disease, since the laws of
statutory construction require that when a statute contains a specifi-
cally enumerated exception, the specifically enumerated exception
must be exclusive.3 9
Based on Congress' stated intention of enacting the Anabolic
Steroids Control Act to protect the public health,"0 and on its ability
to regulate steroids under the Commerce power,"1 the constitutional-
ity of the statute must be tested under a rational basis standard.4
2
The Supreme Court has held that such a standard is appropriate
when Congress is regulating such an important purpose in a nondis-
criminatory manner. 4a To defeat a statute under the rational basis
standard, it must be shown that in enacting the statute, Congress
acted irrationally, or that the enacted statute is not rationally related
to a legitimate legislative purpose granted to Congress under the
Constitution." The Anabolic Steroids Control Act does not pass
muster under this rational basis test.
Although Congress' intentions appear to have been proper, the
enacted statute seems to disregard the vast purposes for which ster-
oids are used that would not fall under the statutory definition of
disease.' 5 Further, criminalization of steroid prescription for athletes
to aid in body building and/or to provide skeletal muscle enlarge-
37. See supra note 25.
38. See supra note 25.
39. See e.g., Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983).
40. See 134 CONG. REC. H7907 (Sept. 22, 1988) (statement of Congressman Baker of
Lousiana).
41. United States v. Kinsey, 843 F.2d 383, 393 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 487 U.S.
1223 (1988), reh'g denied, 488 U.S. 880 (1988).
42. See, e.g., New York State Club Association, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1
(1988); McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969); Williamson v. Lee
Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (holding that person attacking constitutionality of
a statute based on such legislative interests as preserving the health must show that the legisla-
ture acted irrationally and use a rational basis test).
43. See cases cited infra note 44.
44. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. at 312 (1976); Maimed v. Thornburgh, 621 F.2d 565, 573 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 955 (1980).
45. See Robertson, supra note 2, at 2923; May, supra note 9, at 258-60.
97 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW FALL 1992
ment or increased strength by persons in good health may actual
defeat Congress' stated intentions."' By forbidding trained physicians
from administering steroids in a controlled manner, the Legislature
has forced athletes to either buy steroids off the black-market or
seek out un-ethical and possibly incompetent physicians to supply
them steroids.4 The criminalization of "recreational" steroid use has
already led athletes to seek medically unproven and possibly danger-
ous advice from such sources as the Underground Steroid Hand-
book.4 8 Without arguing that steroids should be legalized for "recre-
ational use," it still appears that Congress' attempt at preventing
steroid prescription has at best been futile and at worst harmful.4 9
The narrow language of the statute also presents individuals
who may prescribe steroids with a severe dilemma when deciding
whether to prescribe steroids for a legitimate medical purpose: what
is a disease? A disease is defined as a "deviation from the healthy or
normal condition of any of the functions or tissues of the body...
illness; sickness; disorder; malady; bodily infirmity."5 Congress' pro-
hibition of steroid prescription except for the treatment of a recog-
nized disease is in contradiction of the accepted medical use of ana-
bolic steroids for disease and non-disease conditions.5 1 The Food and
Drug Administration has approved steroid use for non-disease condi-
tions such as allergies, stunted growth in childhood, and maintaining
muscle mass for geriatric patients who, although not suffering from
a specific disease treatable by anabolic steroids, are in a state of
debilitation.5 2 Congress, however, has stated that the Secretary of
Health and Human Services may only exempt steroids from the pro-
hibition if it meets the following criteria (1) the substance must be
accepted treatment for a rare disease or condition; and (2) the sub-
stance must have no significant potential for abuse. 53 Thus, under
the Act, a physician would be held criminally liable for prescribing
steroids for treatment of a legitimate "non-disease" condition. Such
46. R. Gilbert, Steroid Use and Society, J ADDICT RES FOUNDATION 5-6 (1989).
47. Perry, supra note 18, at 427.
48. Perry, supra note 18, at 427.
49. It should be noted that historically steroid use was opposed by medical organizations
and sports groups on the grounds that these substances were ineffective. Robertson, supra note
2, at 2923. With the evidence that steroids may be effective, many of these groups now oppose
steroids for their adverse effects and on the basis of ethics (fair play). Nevertheless, since in
athletics today "winning is everything," it appears that athletes will stop at nothing to gain an
edge, including the continued use of steroids. C. McCollister Evarts, Sports Medicine - the
Profession/The Physician, 18 THE AMER. J. OF SPORTS MED. 438, 438-41 (1990).
50. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 244 (5th ed. 1975).
51. See supra note 48.
52. GOODMAN & GILMAN, supra note 13.
53. 137 CONG. REC. E450-02 (1991).
ANABOLIC STEROIDS CONTROL ACT
a prohibition is not rationally related to the stated governmental in-
terest of protecting the public health.
Further, in treating athletes, a physician may be faced with pos-
sible criminal prosecution for the treatment of a recognized disease.
One could easily imagine an injured athlete receiving steroids for
restorative purposes. It is a sports medicine physician's duty to treat
injured athletes with restorative drugs to aid in their rapid recov-
ery. 54 There is a possibility, however, that under the Act, a physician
prescribing steroids for restorative purposes may be held liable if the
athlete actually uses the drugs for additive purposes; such as increas-
ing muscle mass.5 5 The prescribing physician who is indicted under
the Act may have the burden of providing evidence that his prescrip-
tion was for the restorative purpose, but obviously in such a situation
it becomes the athlete's word against the physician's. Congress' Act
has taken away the physician's broad discretion and has exposed the
profession to possible criminal liability for innocent "malpractice."
Such action is sure to have a chilling effect on the medical commu-
nity and on a physician's decision whether to enter a sports medicine
practice.
As mentioned previously, a question still to be resolved under
the Act is whether an indicted physician has the burden of proving
that his treatment of the patient was for a disease condition. At the
least, it appears that a physician would bear the burden of producing
some evidence that his prescription falls within the limited exclu-
sions.5 6 In various illegal distribution of prescription drug cases,
courts have held that since physicians are registered to dispense pre-
scription drugs, the government must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the physician's actions were outside of the bounds of his
"professional medical practice. ' 57 Thus, the courts have customarily
assumed that a physician's medical decisions are reasonable and the
prosecutor bears the burden of proof that the physician's actions
were outside the bounds of professional medical practice.58 Such a
presumption provides a physician with a reasonable and constitution-
ally necessary defense to an allegation of illegal prescription.
5 9
54. Morley B. Pitt, Malpractice on the Sidelines: Developing a Standard of Care for
Team Sports Physicians, 2 COMM/ENT L.J., 590, 591 (1980).
55. Id. Restorative drugs are used to restore injured players' natural prowess. Additive
drugs are employed to increase performance beyond natural limits.
56. See United States v. Mayo, 705 F.2d 62, 75 (2d Cir. 1983); Patterson v. New York,
432 U.S. 197, 211 (1977); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 704 (1975).
57. United States v. Hooker, 541 F.2d 300 (1st Cir. 1976).
58. Id.
59. See supra note 56.
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The Anabolic Steroids Control Act eliminates this reasonable
assumption. It creates an irrebuttable presumption that the prescrip-
tion of steroids for other than the treatment of disease is outside the
bounds of professional medical practice. The physician is given no
"reasonable degree of discretion" as under the other sections of the
Controlled Substances Act.60 The strict language of the Act states
that absent authorization by the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, any prescription of steroids is implicitly criminal.6"
At least one court which considered such a theoretical presump-
tion has stated that such a statute would place the burden of proving
the applicability of the exception on the physician, and any physician
charged with prescribing or administering a controlled substance
would have the burden at trial of proving a legitimate medical pur-
pose. 2 The effect of such a scheme would be a presumption that
every physician who prescribes a drug does so without a legitimate
medical purpose."3 The court determined that Congress could not in-
tend such an absurd result and therefore such a statute should be
stricken as a violation of a physician's due process rights.6 4
Although Congress has the power to impinge on some aspect of
a doctor's practice, this impingement must constitute a reasonable
exercise of power vested in Congress under the Constitution. 5 An
irrebuttable presumption which takes away a physician's primary de-
fense in prescription of steroids violates the due process clause, by
regulating the practice of medicine and not permitting physicians the
discretion and flexibility necessary to treat individual patients.6
The Anabolic Steroids Control Act is also in direct contradic-
tion to various state laws and the Uniform Controlled Substance
Act, which has been adopted by 51 states and territories.67 Under
these legislative enactments, a physician is allowed to dispense con-
trolled substances as long as it is in good faith in the course of his
professional practice, within the scope of the doctor-patient relation-
60. Id.
61. 21 U.S.C. § 333 (1988).




65. Pharmaceutical Mfrs. v. Food & Drug Admin., 484 F.Supp. 1179, 1188 (D. Del.),
aff d, 634 F.2d 106 (3d Cir. 1980).
66. Id. But cf. United States Dept. of Agric. v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 518 (1973)
(Douglas, J., concurring) (irrebuttable presumption analysis is appropriate only "where the
private interests affected are very important"). See also Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749,
785 (1975) (distinguishing programs involving "affirmative Government action which seriously
curtails important liberties cognizable under the Constitution").
67. See e.g., 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 780-111(d) (1988).
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ship, and in accordance with the treatment principles accepted by a
responsible segment of the medical profession. 8
Many of the state legislatures anticipated the use of steroids for
non-disease conditions and allowed prescription for non-disease con-
ditions by allowing the practitioner in the usual course of his profes-
sional practice to provide steroids for "legitimate medical pur-
poses."6 9 The majority of state legislatures achieved this purpose by
making it illegal to dispense steroids for "recreational use" but al-
lowed the physician to make a good faith determination whether
there is a "medical" need for prescribing the steroids.
7 0
The Anabolic Steroids Control Act does not allow for good faith
determinations by physicians. The Act creates a presumption that
the only accepted use of steroids is for treatment of disease. Thus,
the Anabolic Steroids Control Act would criminalize uses of ana-
bolic steroids that the various state legislatures and the Uniform
Controlled Substances Act have decided should be legal.
Congress' decision to criminalize all uses of anabolic steroids
other than for the treatment of disease is in direct contradiction of
the medical evidence and state legislative findings. Such a broad pro-
hibition is not rationally related to the stated legislative objective of
protecting the health and welfare of the citizens and thus, at the
least infringes on an individual's constitutional right to be free from
arbitrary and unreasonable government action. 7 1 The Fourteenth
Amendment stands for the proposition that the government must act
in a manner which is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. If Congres-
sional legislation is too broad, then the proper remedy is to call the
matter to the attention of Congress.72
Although the Anabolic Steroids Control Act was meant to serve
68. Id.
69. See 1989 HAW. SEss. LAWS 1197 (not unlawful to prescribe steroids if issued for a
legitimate medical purpose by a practitioner acting in the usual course of professional prac-
tice); 1989 TEX. GEN. LAWS 1507 (Anabolic steroid or human growth hormone can only be
prescribed for a valid medical purpose and in the course of professional practice; bodybuilding,
muscle enhancement, or increasing muscle bulk or strength through the use of an anabolic
steroid or human growth hormone by a person in good health is not a valid medical purpose);
1989 N.Y. LAWS 3047 (practitioner may not prescribe anabolic steroids for other than thera-
peutic purposes); 1989 N.H. LAWS 264 1989 (any person who prescribes anabolic steroids for
purposes other than treatment of a medical problem of injury shall be guilty of a felony); 1988
LA. ACTS 270 (prohibiting prescription of anabolic steroids unless required by demonstrable
generally accepted medical practice).
70. May, supra note 9, at 1. A minority of states such as New Mexico make it a crimi-
nal offense to illegally possess or distribute steroids. 1987 N.M. Laws 1987. Other states such
as Arkansas forbid prescription other than for the treatment of disease. 1989 Ark. Acts 1231.
71. Thompson v. Gallagher, 489 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1973).
72. United States v. 233 Tins, 175 F.Supp. 694, 702 (D. Ark. 1959).
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a legitimate governmental purpose, its irrational and arbitrary lan-
guage, which only allows exceptions for "disease" conditions, is so
overbroad that it does not achieve the stated governmental goal.
Such a statute should not be upheld.73 Although statutes need not be
drawn with "mathematical exactitude," an overinclusive or underin-
clusive statute can be facially void if it does not achieve its legiti-
mate purpose.7 Judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate
sweep, the overbreadth of the statute is not only real, but substantial
as well.75 Instead of promoting health and welfare, the Act may pre-
vent individuals from receiving necessary treatment by limiting phy-
sicians to prescription of steroids only for disease. This prevents pa-
tients from receiving necessary steroid treatment for legitimate, non-
disease medical purposes. Although the Supreme Court has held that
a statute should be construed to avoid constitutional problems, the
Act is not subject to such a limiting construction. 71 Since the statute
is not subject to a narrowing construction, is impermissibly over-
broad and is not severable, the statute should be stricken down on its
face.7
Congress has already recognized that anabolic steroids can be
useful as a medical aid, by allowing steroids to be legally used in the
treatment of disease.7 8 Congress must have determined that the ben-
efits of use of steroids for this purpose must outweigh any possible
adverse effects. This implicit balancing test should have led to the
conclusion that steroids can also be used for non-medical purposes if
the benefit outweighs the risk. Congress seems to have ignored this
evidence, and course of current professional practice and it criminal-
ized all other uses, without taking into account the adverse effect on
public health and welfare. Such a limitation could not rationally
have been intended to promote the public health and thus the statute
must be stricken.
73. See Sadler v. Sullivan, 748 F.2d 820, 824 (3d Cir. 1984) ("[h]eavy burden" of over-
coming a presumption of rationality "by a clear showing of arbitrariness and irrationality");
Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 332-33 (1981); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165,
174-75 (1969).
74. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484, 486-87 (1970).
75. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
76. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932). Accord Haynes v. United States, 390
U.S. 85, 92, (1968) (dictum); Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17, 27 (1968); United States v.
Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 45 (1953); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288,
348 (1936) (Brandeis, J. concurring).
77. United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971).
78. See 21 U.S.C. § 333(e)(1) (Supp. 11 1991).
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A. The Anabolic Steroids Control Act of 1990 Unconstitutionality
by Intrusion upon the State's Traditional Regulation of the Practice
of Medicine
The right to practice one's chosen profession, including
medicine, is protected by both the due process clause and the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 79 However, "[i]t is
long settled that states have a legitimate interest in regulating the
practice of medicine." 80
Even though courts have held that the practice of medicine is an
area traditionally regulated by the states, the provisions of a federal
act are not invalidated solely because they may at times impinge on
some aspect of a doctor's practice.81 These courts have also held that
a physician does have specific limited rights to practice medicine. 82
These rights include those that are necessary to facilitate the exer-
cise of a right that patients were found to possess. 83 The physician's
rights are thus derivative of patient rights and do not exist indepen-
dent of those rights.84
However, a physician also has a specific right to administer
medical care to his patients.85 If a statute has a sufficient deleterious
impact on the right of a patient to receive such care then this statute
is a violation of the constitution.86 Thus, the physician is granted a
right based on the patient's right to make important decisions con-
cerning all medical treatment, free of unwarranted governmental in-
terference.87 The statute has already interfered with a patient's right
to receive medical treatment "free from unwarranted governmental
interference." 88 By limiting a physician from prescribing steroids for
a legitimate purpose, in the physician's good faith professional view,
the statute irrationally eliminates a possible alternative treatment for
patients. Such a statute is facially unconstitutional and must be
stricken.
79. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957).
80. Eatough v. Albano, 673 F.2d 671, 676 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1119 (1982);
see also Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 827 (1975).
81. Meier v. Anderson, 692 F.Supp. 546, 549 (E.D. Pa. 1988), aff'd without opinion,
869 F.2d 590 (3d Cir. 1989).
82. Id. at 550.
83. Id. at 549.
84. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 593 (1977).
85. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 197-99 (1973).
86. Whalen, 692 F. Supp. at 604 n.33.
87. Meier, 692 F. Supp. at 549. But see, Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) noted
by the Whalen Court thus suggesting that the areas of protection are more limited.
88. Thompson v. Gallagher, 489 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1973).
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B. Unconstitutionality of the Anabolic Steroids Control Act of
1990 as Applied to Physicians as a Group
The right to practice one's profession is neither explicitly nor
implicitly enumerated in the Constitution, and cannot, therefore, be
considered a fundamental right.89 Because health care providers are
neither a suspect nor a quasi-suspect class, a rational relation test is
the appropriate test of the constitutionality of the Anabolic Steroids
Control Act."0 To pass constitutional muster under this test, a stat-
ute must be rationally related to the achievement of a legitimate
governmental interest.91 The statute is overturned only if a court
concludes that the legislature's actions in passing the statute were
irrational.92 The great deference given to legislatures under this stan-
dard is underscored by the courts' willingness to uphold a statute "if
any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it."
93
Under the rational relation test, a court would require that the
party seeking to void the statute must bear the burden of proving the
unconstitutionality. "  However, since a physician's right to practice
his profession free from unreasonable governmental interference falls
within the "liberty" and "property" concepts of the fifth and four-
teenth amendments, legislation aimed at regulating the profession in
the public interest must be aimed at furthering a legitimate govern-
mental interest and must in fact be rationally related to such a pur-
pose.9" The corollary of this proposition is that the states may rea-
sonably regulate the professions in the public interest without
violating the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 96
89. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) ("[A]
standard less than strict scrutiny 'has consistently been applied to state legislation restricting
the availability of employment opportunities.' ") (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471, 485 (1970)); Harper v. Lindsay, 616 F.2d 849, 854 (5th Cir. 1980).
90. Eatough, 673 F.2d at 676; McCoy v. Commonwealth Bd. of Medical Educ. & Li-
censure, 391 A.2d 723, 728 (1978); see also Brandwein v. California Bd. of Osteopathic Ex-
aminers, 708 F.2d 1466, 1470 (9th Cir. 1983); Rabino v. Commonwealth State Registration
Bd. for Professional Eng'rs, 450 A.2d 773, 775 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982); Kennedy v. Hughes,
596 F. Supp. 1487, 1492-93 (D. Del. 1984).
91. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. at 312; Maimed v. Thornburgh, 621 F.2d 565, 573 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 955 (1980).
92. Eatough v. Albano, 673 F.2d 671, 676 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting Vance v. Bradley,
440 U.S. 93, 97, 99 (1979)).
93. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
94. Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979); Vance, 440 U.S. 93, 111.
95. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners,
353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957). See also Note, Within the States' Jurisdiction: Metropolitan,
Northeast Bancorp, and the Equal Protection Clause, 96 YALE L. 2109, 2123 (1987).
96. See McCoy v. Commonwealth Bd. of Medical Educ. & Licensure, 391 A.2d 723,
727 (1978).
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"The right to practice one's chosen profession, including
medicine, is protected by both the due process clause and the equal
protection clause . . . -9 "(T)he right to practice one's chosen pro-
fession free from unreasonable government interference falls within
the liberty and property concepts of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments."' 98 Government action which is arbitrary or irrational violates
the due process clause and cannot be sustained. 99
A physician has a right to exercise judgment in prescribing
treatment and to exercise his professional judgment in prescribing
medication to his patients. 100 The Anabolic Steroids Control Act rep-
resents an unreasonable governmental interference with a physician's
liberty right to practice medicine without governmental interference,
because the Act is overly restrictive and does not preserve a practi-
tioner's discretion to treat his patients in accordance with treatment
principles accepted by a responsible segment of the medical profes-
sion. Although, the practice of medicine may be subject to limiting
regulations, such regulation must further a legitimate state inter-
est.' 0 ' Courts throughout the United States have always given great
deference to a physician's reasonable medical decisions. 02 In matters
concerning diagnosis and medical treatment, the courts allow the
physician to make such a decision and defer to his judgment. 3 Con-
gress's refusal to defer to physicians' informed medical decisions in
regard to steroid prescription represents a significant interference
with a physician's ability to best care for his patients. In fact, the
Act may force a physician to disregard the American Medical Asso-
ciation's (AMA) Medical Ethics Code, which advises that the inter-
est of the patient is paramount in the practice of medicine.0"
Further, the AMA's Medical Ethics Code provides that drugs
may only be supplied or dispensed if it is in the best interest of the
patient.0 5 Even though it may be in the best interests of a physi-
cian's patients, the physician may be precluded from prescribing
97. Meier v. Anderson, 692 F.Supp. 546, 549 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (citing Schware v. Board
of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957)).
98. Id. at 551-52 (citing Greene v. McElroy 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959)).
99. Neiderhiser v. Berwick, 840 F.2d 213, 217 (3d Cir.), cert. denied subnom. Berwick
v. Neiderhiser, 488 U.S. 822 (1988).
100. Pharmaceutical Mfrs. v. Food and Drug Admin., 484 F. Supp. 1179 (D. Del.),
aff'd, 634 F.2d 106 (3d Cir. 1980).
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., Everett v. Franciscan Sisters Healthcare Inc., 882 F.2d 1383 (8th Cir.
1989).
103. Id.
104. OPINIONS AND REPORTS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIA-
TION 56 (1969).
105. Id. at 49.
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steroids for "non-disease" problems or face criminal prosecution.
Such a statue is unconstitutional in that it represents an unreasona-
ble governmental interference with the practice of medicine, because
it is overly restrictive and does not preserve a physician's discretion
to treat his patients "in accordance with treatment principles ac-
cepted by a responsible segment of the medical profession."
Finally, the Anabolic Steroids Control Act is unconstitutional as
it applies to physicians because it violates a physician's Due Process
rights. The Act creates an irrebuttable statutory presumption that
any use of steroids other than for the treatment of disease has no
legitimate medical validity or purpose and does not amount to proper
medical practice."' 6 Such a presumption violates a physician's Due
Process right to determine what is in the course of professional
practice.
10 7
III. Public Policy Reasons for Invalidation of the Anabolic Steroids
Control Act of 1990
Courts throughout the United States have given physicians the
duty and the responsibility to give warnings about the side effects
and consequences of using prescription drugs." 8 The physician has
the task of weighing the benefits of any medication against its poten-
tial dangers. 09 It becomes the prescriber's duty to protect the con-
suming public from injury caused by prescription drugs and the pre-
scriber will be held civilly liable for failure to give a warning that a
reasonable medical practitioner in the community would make under
the same or similar circumstances. 1 0 Thus, it has become the policy
decision of courts throughout the United States that a physician is in
the best position to protect his patients by giving adequate warnings
and by exercising his medical judgment in prescribing medication. 1
106. See supra note 3.
107. See Everett v. Franciscan Sisters Health Care, Inc., 882 F.2d 1383 (8th Cir. 1989).
108. See, e.g., Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., No. 91-1915, 1992 WL 240679 (1st Cir.
Sept. 30, 1992). A doctor's duty is to inform his patient what a reasonable prudent medical
specialist would tell a person of ordinary understanding of the serious risks and the possibility
of serious harm which may occur from a supposed course of therapy so that the patient's
choice will be an intelligent one, based upon sufficient knowledge to enable him to balance the
possible risks against the possible benefits. Harbeson v. Parke Davis, Inc., 746 F.2d 517, 523
(1984). The extent of disclosure is a matter of medical judgment. Id.
109. Buckner v. Allegran Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 400 So.2d 820, 822 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981).
110. Id.
11. See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1096 (1974); Chambers v. G.D. Searle and Co., 567 F.2d 269 (4th Cir. 1977); Dalke v.
Upjohn Co., 555 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1977); Sterling Drugs, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82 (8th
Cir. 1966); McCue v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 453 F.2d 1033 (lst Cir. 1972). These cases all
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The Anabolic Steroids Control Act usurps the physician's medi-
cal judgment and replaces it with an overly restrictive, irrational
governmental prohibition against prescription of steroids except in
the. treatment of disease. Since the purpose of the regulation of ster-
oids is to promote public health, this unnecessary restriction defeats
the current public policy protecting physicians' discretion in the care
of their patients.112 The Anabolic Steroids Control Act is in direct
opposition to a physician's longstanding duty to utilize the ordinary
knowledge and skill of his profession in undertaking the care and
treatment of his patient.
1 3
Courts have already held that the social utility derived from
prescription medication such as anabolic steroids cannot be disputed
and a physician should be able to prescribe steroids without fear of
being exposed to liability." 4 Congress's action may have a detrimen-
tal effect on patient health care if physicians are forced to weigh
their patient's needs against their potential for being held criminally
liable for attempting to treat non-disease conditions. 1 5
Exposing physicians to criminal liability for attempting to best
care for their patients may result in physicians refusing to treat any
individual with human growth hormone or anabolic steroids. Such a
result would also defeat the Legislature's stated purpose of improv-
ing health care. 1 6 The Legislature should allow the medical commu-
nity, the real experts, to decide when an individual should be allowed
to consume steroids.
The AMA has already expressed strong views with regard to
steroid use." 7 The AMA Council on Scientific Affairs recommended
hold that a manufacturer of prescription drugs must only give an adequate warning to pre-
scribing members of the medical community, while the actual prescribers have the duty to
inform patients of the risks and adverse effects of the drugs.
112. See, e.g., Everett v. Franciscan Sisters Healthcare, Inc., 882 F.2d 1383 (8th Cir.
1989).
113. Schwab v. Tolley, 345 So.2d 747, 752 (Fla. 1977) (affirming jury instructions
which stated that "the duty of a physician in connection with the diagnosis and treatment of a
patient is that the physician must use the ordinary skills and means and methods that are
recognized as necessary ...").
114. Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992, 997 (Ind. 1991) (physician held not liable for
third person injury caused when physician's patient went into psychological rage as a result of
the physician's prescription of steroids to patient)..
115. Id.
116. 135 CONG. REC. S14519-06 (1990).
117. Robertson, supra note 2, at 2926-27. The AMA Council on Scientific Affairs rec-
ommended the following action with regard to steroid use prior to the enactment of the Ana-
bolic Steroid Control Act of 1990:
I. The AMA reaffirm its concerns over the nonmedical use of drugs among ath-
letes, its belief that drug use to enhance or sustain athletic performance is inap-
propriate, its commitment to cooperate with various other concerned organiza-
tions, and its support of appropriate education and rehabilitation programs.
97 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW FALL 1992
increased criminal penalties for misprescribing steroids, but only for
steroids that have been misprescribed for non-medical use."' Specifi-
cally, the AMA recognizes that the use of steroids for non-medical
purposes presents a severe problem to the health of society, and that
steroid use is inappropriate to enhance or sustain athletic perform-
ance.119 The AMA recognized that scheduling of steroids under the
federal Controlled Substances Act would not result in any reduction
in non-medical use of steroids since the majority of improperly used
steroids come from the black-market.
20
In this regard, the AMA has given testimony to Congress op-
posing the scheduling of steroids under the Controlled Substances
Act.' 2 ' The AMA expressed its concerns over non-medical use of
steroids, but also expressed its belief that congressional intervention
would be ineffective.' 22 The Legislature's failure to defer to the gov-
erning body of physicians in the United States was inappropriate and
results in severe limitations on a physician's ability to practice
medicine. The overbroad language of the Anabolic Steroids Control
Act has created the problems anticipated by the AMA; ineffective
regulation which ties the hands of the primary care givers in the
2. The AMA reaffirm its support of increased criminal penalties enacted as a
part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 and its support of state legislation that
addresses the problem of misprescribing.
3. The AMA reaffirm its opposition to scheduling of anabolic-androgenic ster-
oids under the federal Controlled Substances Act.
4. The AMA reaffirm its willingness to work closely with sports groups, coaches,
team owners, amateur and professional athletes, and parents.
5. The AMA continue to endorse the professional education campaign of the
FDA.
6. The AMA make available to practicing physicians, legislators, sports organi-
zations, educators, adolescents, and the public existing and proposed educational
materials and model state legislation on the nonmedical use of anabolic-andro-
genic steroids.
7. The AMA identify and widely disseminate information on successful initiative
and activities to curtail the problem of nonmedical use.
8. The AMA encourage survey efforts that provide a better understanding of the
nature and prevalence of nonmedical use.
9. The AMA actively encourage further research on short- and long-term health
effects and encourage reporting of suspected adverse effects to the FDA.
10. The AMA continue to work with sports organizations to increase under-




120. Id. See also 135 CONG. REC. S14519-06 (1990). The Department of Justice esti-
mates that on the black market, the annual sales of these drugs is about $300 to $400 million.
The Justice Department believes that the source of black market steroids is divided evenly
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United States.
Finally, physicians are held civilly liable for failure to give ade-
quate warnings or for prescribing medication outside of the proper
practice of medicine.12 Various legislatures and society as a whole
have been alarmed by the escalating costs of malpractice insur-
ance. 124 The increase of civil suits and the rise in malpractice insur-
ance has caused some physicians to be unable or unwilling to prac-
tice medicine. 25 Physicians are already punished for conduct that is
contrary to the health and welfare of their patients by the availabil-
ity of malpractice suits. 26 Thus, criminal penalties only provide an
additional deterrent, not an exclusive deterrent.
A criminal deterrent may be desirable to protect the public
from doctors acting outside of the scope of their professional con-
duct, but is clearly undesirable as applied against physicians acting
within the scope of their professional conduct. Physicians acting
outside of the scope of their professional conduct are already exposed
to civil checks on their behavior and some have stated that the addi-
tional liability may result in their refusal to treat individuals with
steroids.127 Additional criminal measures only serve to confuse physi-
cians and perhaps prevent them from being able to effectively treat
their patients.
Thus, Congress disregarded the information submitted by the
recognized authorities on prescription drugs. Instead, perhaps caught
up in the strong public concern over steroids in general, Congress
enacted an overly restrictive prohibition on steroid use. Such a stat-
ute achieves no stated governmental purpose other than to make vot-
ers aware that Congress has taken action.
IV. Conclusion
The Anabolic Steroids Control Act of 1990 should be stricken
on its face as unconstitutionally overbroad and unconstitutional as it
applies to physicians. The Legislature attempted to answer what it
perceived as a growing problem; the non-medical use of anabolic-
androgenic steroids. Unfortunately, the resulting legislative enact-
123. See, e.g., Buckner v. Allegran Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 400 So.2d 820, 822 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
124. See Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 474 U.S. 892, 895 (1985).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. James H. Davis, "Fixing" the Standard of Care: Motivated Athletes and Medical
Malpractice, 12 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOCACY 215, 230 (1988) (physician interviewed stated that
he may be unwilling to treat athletes if possibility existed that he would be subject to more
civil liability).
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ment is overbroad and improperly defines what constitutes informed
medical practice. The Act overrides the current public policy of
granting great deference to a physician's judgment in matters of
medicine concerning their patients.
The statute's vagueness and overbreadth is not rationally related
to the Legislature's legitimate government interest and cannot with-
stand an attack even under the rational basis standard promulgated
by the Supreme Court. Because of the statute's irrationality and the
inability to construe it within a constitutionally permissible limita-
tion, it must be stricken on its face.
The statute is also unconstitutional as it applies to physicians. It
places an impermissible, irrebuttable presumption on physicians that
makes the defense of a physician charged under the statute ex-
tremely difficult, if not impossible. Further, the act represents a seri-
ous interference with a physician's right to practice medicine, and
with the patient's right to receive the best, informed medical care.
Such a statute represents a violation of a physician's basic constitu-
tional rights and as such must be stricken on its face.
Finally, the Act represents a departure from past and current
public policy. The Legislature and the courts have always deferred
to the medical community's decisions about what is in the best inter-
est of their patients. The Anabolic Steroids Control Act, eliminates
this deference, with regard to steroid prescription, and instead repre-
sents a legislative opinion that is contrary to the opinion formed by
the "real experts" in this field. Such a statute should be stricken as
contrary to the best interests of society.
Jeffrey A. Black
